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The World Trade Organization and
States' Rights: Will Foreign Threats over
Massachusetts' Burma Law Lead to a
Domestic Backlash Against International
Trade Agreements?
By BRIAN OWENS*
I. Introduction
The creation of the World Trade Organization (VITO) in 1994
ushered in a new era in international trade dispute resolution. For
the first time, nations throughout the world ceded the authority to
issue sanctions against any nation found in violation of international
trade rules to an international trade tribunal.! However, this newly
enhanced power also brought about a proportionate decrease in
national sovereignty.2 As a result, since the creation of the WTO,
international law scholars have dissected and scrutinized the WTO's
usurpation of national sovereignty?
Similarly significant are the ramifications of the United States'
membership in the WTO for states' rights.4 While many scholars
argue that states are constitutionally barred from conducting foreign
policy,5 the practical reality of states engaging in foreign policy is well-
* Member of the Class of 1999; B.A. University of California, Berkeley, 1995.
1. See Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Remedies Against "Unfair" International Trade
Practices, 942 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 123,126 (1994).
2. See Gordon Fairclough, Massachusetts' Burma Law is Challenged, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., July 23,1997, at 2.
3. See, eg., Claudia Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing
Their Sovereign Rights? The GATT Dispute Settlement Process in a Globalized
Economy, 4 TuiJ J. INT'L & Co!Pf. L. 161 (1996); John H. Jackson, The Great 1994
Sovereignty Debate United States Acceptance and Implementation of tie Uruguay
Round Results, 36 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157 (1997).
4. See, eg., Samuel C. Straight, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute
Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DuKE LJ. 216 (1995).
5. See, eg., Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United
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documented. Moreover, what separates state governments from
national governments is the host of protections built into the WTO
for member nations compared with the lack of comparable
protections afforded to sub-national entities.
Although member nations relinquished some of their sovereign
power over international commerce, the WTO provides a lengthy
process in which member nations can defend their challenged trade
practices. For example, the WTO can take no action against a
member nation on its own cognizance. Rather, another member
nation must first bring a dispute before the WTO prior to the WTO
authorizing any action against a member nation.
In contrast to member nations, states and other sub-national
governments have no standing before the WTO.7 They can neither
States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443 (1998) (arguing that state
and municipal governments may not unconstitutionally interfere in foreign affairs
and foreign commerce). See also Jennifer Loeb-Cederwall, Restrictions on Trade
with Burma: Bold Moves or Foolish Acts?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REv. 929 (1998) (making
a case for federal preemption of state laws engaged in! foreign policy). Compare
Alejandra Carvajal, State and Local "Free Burma" Laws: The Case Jbr Sub-National
Trade Sanctions, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 257, 259 (1998) ("state and localities are
constitutionally entitled to enact selective-purchasing laws based on such
fundamental rights as federalism, freedom of speech, and spending power").
Earlier this year, the National Foreign Trade Council (NFIC) filed suit in
federal court to enjoin Massachusetts from enforcing its Burma law. See Jana Byron,
Supercomputer Decontrol? HNSC Report Threatens Computer Exports, EXPORT
PRAcr., May 15, 1998, at 16. The NFTC is comprised of nearly six hundred business
firms, including some of the most powerful corporations in the United States. See id.
The NFTC based its challenge, in part, on the grounds that the U.S. Constitution
vests complete foreign policy power in the federal government and that the
Massachusetts law violates the Foreign Commerce Clause. See Marc Selinger, Critics
of WTO Lose Vote in House, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1998, at B7. As the NFTC
president stated, "Our system of government was not designed to allow the fifty
states and hundreds of municipalities to conduct their own individual foreign
policies." Byron, supra, at 16. The European Union also entered the fray by filing an
amicus curiae brief in support of the NFTC's lawsuit. See Jim Lobe, Clinton Manages
to Avert Blow to WTO's Power, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Atug. 7,1998, at 1, available in
1998 WL 5988673. In addition to the NFTC, US Engage, an ad hoc business group of
667 business and agricultural organizations, is actively fighting the proliferation of
state and local laws designed to sanction businesses investing in disfavored foreign
governments. See Sarah Jackson, Trade Group Sues U.S. State over Myanmar
Sanctions Law, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL
2272315.
6. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66
FORDHAM L. REv. 567, 583 (1997) (discussing "the rising profile of subnational
governments on the international stage and its possible implications for international
legal process").
7. See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade
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bring a dispute before the WTO nor defend themselves against an
attack on their domestic laws from other WTO member nations!
States are, quite literally, helpless to defend themselves. Moreover,
because the United States' federal system is an uncommon form of
government,9 most other member nations do not face a similar
quandary as the United States does. Accordingly, other member
nations are unlikely to sympathize with state sovereignty concerns
within the United States.
The dilemma of state laws losing authority to binding
international agreements is exemplified by Massachusetts, which
passed a law barring public agencies from doing business with any
companies investing in Burma."0 In response to the Massachusetts
law, both the European Union (EU) and Japan formally challenged
the state law before the WTO, arguing that the Massachusetts law
violated U.S. obligations under international trade rules." Because
Massachusetts has no standing before the WTO, the U.S. government
had to choose between defending a law it did not promulgate or
allowing an international trade tribunal to approve sanctions against
one of it's own states. Many scholars feared that the latter would
cause a domestic backlash against international trade agreements,
thereby compromising the United States' ability to enter into any
future international trade arrangements. 2
This Note will examine the propriety of the United States'
pressuring the WTO member nations to broaden standing to include
individual states like Massachusetts, or in the alternative, of Congress
passing a law that mandates the U.S. government represent and
defend states' challenged laws before the WTO. Part H analyzes the
WTO's current dispute settlement system. Part IH considers the
United States' effort to quell state discontent with the proposed WTO
when domestic support was necessary for United States' ratification
of the WTO agreement. Part IV examines the Massachusetts law that
Organization Disputes to Nongovernnient Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L 295,
303-04 (1996) (arguing against extension of WTO standing to include private parties).
8. See id.
9. Canada and Australia have similar federalist systems where provinces share
substantial governing power with the national government.
10. See Act of June 25,1996, ch. 130, § 1, 1996 Mass. Acts 210.
11. Marc Selinger, State Law Punishing Burma Probed, VASH. TIMEs, Oct. 22,
1998, at B8.
12 See, e.g., GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S. 2467 Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 307 (1994)
(prepared statement of Professor Laurence H. Tribe) [hereinafter Tribe statement].
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restricts doing business with companies that invest in Burma. Finally,
Part V proposes granting standing to states to defend themselves
before the WTO against member nations who seek to sanction a state
for domestic policies that conflict with international law, or in the
alternative, mandating the U.S. government represent state interests
before the WTO.
H. The World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement System
The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (Uruguay Round)
opened in September 1986 with a focus on strengthening the GATT
dispute resolution process.13 The ambitious agenda for the Uruguay
Round covered virtually every facet of trade including trade in goods,
services, trade-related investments, trade-related aspects of
intellectual property and agricultural subsidies. 4 On April 15, 1994,
representatives from 124 governments and the EU signed the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (Final Act).'5 The U.S. House of Representatives
adopted this GATT legislation in November 1994.16 The U.S. Senate
subsequently ratified the legislation on December 1, 1994, by a vote
of 76 to 24.'
The most significant development from the Final Act was the
establishment of the WTO to administer trade dispute settlement
procedures on behalf of GAT' 8 Under the WTO dispute settlement
system, decisions are binding on all member nations." Moreover,
once the WTO rendered a decision, it has the authority to authorize
trade sanctions against the member nation found in violation of
13. See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, 33 GATT
B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.) at 19 (1987).
14. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform
in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'LL. 477,477-78 (1994).
15. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (Supp. 1998)) [hereinafter Uruguay
Round].
16. See David E. Sanger, House Approves Trade Agreement by a Wide Margin,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1994, at Al.
17. See Elaine S. Povich, New Era in World Trade Begins as Senate Approves
GATT Treaty, CHic. TRIB., Dec. 2,1994, at 1.
18. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, art. Ill, para. 3, reprinted in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF TE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 6,7
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1143,1145 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
19. See id. at art. II.
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international law. 0 This provision contrasts sharply with past dispute
resolution procedures. Previously, any member nation could reject
the dispute findings under GATT, thereby preventing authorized
sanctions or jeopardizing membership in GATT.2'
In order to implement the new dispute settlement resolution, the
WTO created several bodies empowered to perform specific roles in
dispute resolution: the dispute settlement body, panels and
Secretariat.'
A. The Dispute Settlement Body
A central feature of the Final Act is the establishment of a
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) responsible for administering the
rules and procedures of dispute settlement.' The GATT General
Council has the responsibility of establishing the DSB, appointing a
president and staff and promulgating the rules of the DSB* '
Specifically, the DSB is responsible for the adoption of panel and
appellate reports, the implementation of rulings and
recommendations and for disciplinary action against member nations
who do not comply with the panel rulings and recommendations?0
B. Panel
The panels were created to assist the DSB in discharging its
responsibilities. The panels, however, merely serve in an advisory
capacity and have no formal authority to implement or enforce WTO
procedures and policy.' Rather, the panels are authorized to make
an objective assessment of the matter in dispute, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the conformity of the
disputed measures with the relevant agreement0 The panels will also
make any additional findings that are necessary to assist the DSB in
20. See id.
21. See Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 478.
22. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(the Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter GATT
Agreement].
23. See iL atart.2.
24. See Uruguay Round Agreement is Reached, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No.
49, at 2103 (Dec. 15,1993).
25. See GATT Agreement, supra note 22, at art. 2.
26. See id. at art. 11.1.
27. See id
28. See iL
1998]
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rendering its final decision.'
Each panel is composed of three panelists, unless the parties to
the dispute mutually agree to a five-person panel?° The panels are
comprised of well-qualified government and nongovernmental
individuals.31 These individuals may not be citizens of any member
nations who are parties to the dispute, unless the parties to the
dispute mutually agree otherwise.32 The Secretariat is responsible for
choosing and maintaining a list of qualified persons to serve on the
panels.33 While the panels have no formal authority apart from
merely assisting the DSB in its decision, the DSB may not render a
final decision that conflicts with the findings of the panel unless it
achieves a consensus of all member nations.' Thus, in practice, the
panels have considerable ability to shape DSB resolution of disputes.
C. Appellate Body
The Final Act also created a standing appellate body empowered
with the responsibility of reviewing the legal interpretations and
findings of the panels. 5 The appellate body consists of seven persons
who serve four-year terms, and each person may be re-elected only
once.? Appointing persons to the appellate body is solely within the
discretion of the dispute settlement body. However, the appellate
body must be broadly representative of the WTO membership and
composed of persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated
expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the
covered agreements generally.' Additionally, the persons must be
unaffiliated with any government and hold no interest in the matter in
29. See id.
30. See id. at art. 8.5.
31. See id. at art. 8.1.
32. See id. at art. 8.3. For a discussion on the propriety of excluding citizens of
member nations to the dispute, see Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 483 ("[t]hat rule
makes perfect sense when the panelists are government officials. It i; less persuasive
when the panelists are private individuals. On the contrary, in some cases it would be
essential to have a panel member able to understand the legal and administrative
system of the State party to the disputes. It has been proposed to include rather than
to exclude citizens to parties").
33. See GATT Agreement, supra note 22, at art. 8.4.
34. See id. at art. 16.4.
35. See id. at arts. 17.1-17.8.
36. See id. at arts. 17.1-17.2.
37. See id. at art. 17.2.
38. See id. at art. 17.3.
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which they participate. 9 Ultimately, the appellate body has the
authority to modify, reverse or uphold the findings and conclusions of
the panels. °
D. Secretariat
Article XXVII of the Final Act delineates the role and
responsibilities of the Secretariat.4 The Secretariat is responsible for
educating member nations on the procedures of the WTO's dispute
resolution system. 2 The Secretariat also assists the DSB panelists on
the legal and procedural aspects of any dispute and provides technical
assistance, including external experts on any matter before the
panelists.
43
E. Bringing a Complaint Before the WTO
Before any complaint may be brought before the WTO, the
member nation seeking to adjudicate the dispute must first attempt to
consult with the opposing party in an effort to reach an amicable
resolution of the dispute." In the WTO's view, "a solution mutually
acceptable to the parties to a dispute... is clearly to be preferred.''
If the consultation with the opposing party fails, the member nation
may then request the establishment of a panel to resolve the dispute."
Under the Final Act, establishment of a DSB panel may be
sought only under two circumstances. First, it may be sought by the
member nation requesting consultation after the opposing party has
failed to reply to the request for consultation within ten days or has
failed to enter into consultation within thirty days. Second, it may
be sought by the member nation requesting consultation if the
consultation fails to settle the dispute within sixty days from the
request for consultation." In either case, a formal written request for
the establishment of the panel indicating whether consultations were
held, identifying the specific issues and providing a summary of the
39. See iUJ
40. See &L at art. 17.13.
41. See iU. at arts. 27.1-27.3.
42. See id. at art. 27.3.
43. See id at art. 27.1.
44. See id at arts. 4.1-4.3.
45. Id at art. 3.7.
46. See id at art. 4.7.
47. See id at art. 4.3.
48. See id at art. 4.7.
1998]
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legal basis of the complaint must be made.49
Under article III, paragraph 2 of the Final Act, only member
nations of the WTO may bring a complaint against another member
nation." Neither sub-national governments, such as individual states,
nor private parties are granted the right to bring a complaint before
the WTO.51 Instead, these nonmembers must rely on the willingness
of their own nation to bring a complaint on their behalf. 2
After a panel is established and reviews the complaint, the panel
will submit its factual findings to the parties of the dispute." This
procedure is meant to allow the parties an opportunity to provide
written feedback after the panel makes its initial determinationY
After considering the parties' written comments, the panel will then
submit an interim report that includes its legal and factual findings!'
The interim report is considered the final report, and it will be
circulated to all member nations of the WTO.56
F. Appealing the Panel Report
Once the panel's final report is submitted, the Final Act grants
all member nations the right to appeal the panel report to the
appellate body.' If a member nation initiates an appeal, the DSB will
not adopt the report until the appellate process is concluded." In
reviewing the panel's report, the appellate body will have the power
to modify, reverse or uphold the legal findings and conclusions of the
panel." The appellate body's subsequent report must then be
adopted by the DSB and accepted by the parties to the dispute, unless
the DSB decides unanimously to reject the appellate report."
49. See id. at art. 6.2.
50. See id. at art. 3.2.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and
Institutions for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 549-50 (1993).
53. See GATr Agreement, supra note 22, at art. 15.1.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 15.2.
56. See id.
57. See id. at art. 17.4.
58. See id. at art. 16.4.
59. See id. at art. 17.13.
60. See id. at art. 17.14.
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G. Implementing the Panel Report
If the panel report is not appealed, or if the appeal is
unsuccessful, the DSB will implement the panel report.61 First, the
DSB will inform the losing party that it must bring the challenged
policy into conformity with GAF. If, after a reasonable amount of
time set by the DSB, but not to exceed fifteen months, the losing
party does not bring its challenged policy into conformity with
GATT, the DSB may grant "measures of retaliation."'" The measures
of retaliation include the authority to grant sanctions against the
losing party.6'
I. State Apprehension to U.S. Membership in the World
Trade Organization
By their inherent nature, international trade agreements
inevitably lead to some loss of sovereignty for national governments.'
With the advent of the WTO's dispute resolution system, this loss of
sovereignty has become more acute. In addition, with no significant
protections from foreign attack, sub-national governments are the
most vulnerable. Even before the creation of the WTO, Professor
Robert Hudec asserted that "the weight of the evidence... obligates
the United States to compel state adherence to GATT, and that
GATT is thus superior to state law."'" In a host of opinions, U.S.
courts appear to share this view.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly determined
the application of GATT to state law, a number of state courts have
held that GATT supersedes state law.6' For example, in Baldwin-
Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Court of
61. See id. at art. 19.1.
62. See id.
63. Id. at arts. 21.2-21.3.
64. See id.
65. See Straight, supra note 4, at 254 (rejecting fears that the WTO unnecessarily
usurps state power).
66. Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GA7T in the Domestic Law of the
United States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATE 221 (Meinhard Hilf ct al.
eds., 1986) (providing a framework for GATr's status in U.S. federal law).
67. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs of Dep't of Water and
Power, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221 (1969); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Super. Ct., 208
Cal. App. 2d 803 (1962); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water
Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977); see also Harry L. Usher, Buy-American
Policy: Conflict with GATT and the Constitution, 17 STAN. L REv. 119 (1964).
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Appeal found that GATT preempts California law." In Baldwin-
Lima, construction companies placed bids for a power plant project
that required all construction equipment and materials to be
manufactured in the United States in accordance with a California
"buy-American" law.69 The construction company that won the bid
violated the buy-American provision by including foreign materials in
its bid.' The company purposely disregarded the "buy-American"
law7 on advice from the San Francisco City Attorney that the law was
unenforceable.' After analyzing the Supremacy Clause and the
treaty power of the federal government, the court concluded that
"[w]hen a state statute conflicts with any such treaty, the latter will
control. Compacts and similar international agreements, such as
GAIT, which are negotiated and proclaimed by the President are
treaties within the above Supremacy Clause of the Constitution."73
Accordingly, GATT trumps California law.
Similarly, in KSB Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District
Water Supply Commission, the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed
a state law mandating American-made materials for construction of
water diversion and treatment facilities.74 The court provided the
following interpretation of GATT: "GATT is, by virtue of the
federal constitution, the supreme 'Law of the Land.' A state law must
yield when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or provisions of
a treaty."75 Despite this reasoning, however, the court ruled that the
state law was exempt from GATT since it merely required use of
American goods for government purposes (e.g. dam building), not for
production of goods for sale.76
68. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp, 208 Cal. App. 2d at 808.
69. Id. at 807.
70. See id. at 808.
71. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 4303 (West 1995). Section 4303 provides:
"The governing body of any political subdivision, municipal corporation, or
district, and any public officer or person charged with the letting of contracts
for (1) the construction, alteration, or repair of public works or (2) for the
purchasing of materials for public use, shall let such contracts only to
persons who agree to use or supply only such unmanufactured materials as
have been produced in the United States, and only such manufactured
materials as have been manufactured in the United States, substantially all
from materials produced in the United States."
72. See Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 208 Cal. App. 2d at 808.
73. Id. at 820. 1
74. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp., 381 A.2d at 778.
75. Id. at 777-78.
76. See id. at 780-82.
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Other states became concerned that their domestic laws could be
adversely affected by international trade agreements when a GATT£
resolution panel issued a decision commonly known as "Beer H" in
1991.' Beer II involved a dispute between Canada and the United
States over federal and state tax laws.O Canada alleged that the
federal and state tax laws favored U.S. beer and wine producers over
foreign producers in violation of GATT' articles IH(1), (2) and (4).
In a widely criticized opinion, wherein the GATT panel attempted to
interpret U.S. domestic law, the GATT panel held that tax laws in
thirty states violated GATT.8 Accordingly, the panel recommended
that the U.S. government mandate the states to bring the challenged
laws into conformity with GATT."1
The GAT panel's attack on state laws in Beer II merely served
to reinforce state fears that international trade agreements were
eroding state sovereignty. In fact, during congressional hearings over
ratification of the Uruguay Round, some of the most passionate
testimony centered around the potential affect that ratification of the
Uruguay Round would have on state law. As Professor Laurence
Tribe articulated:
Whereas Congress may choose between a GATT-illegal federal law
and the WTO-imposed sanctions, a state whose law has been found
in violation of GATT provisions will know that if it does not
change its law, one of the following will occur. Congress may
preempt the offending state law; the Executive Branch may bring
an action against the state and persuade a court to strike the law
down under GATT; or the nation as a whole will be subject to
retaliatory sanctions. If the state does not wish to change its law,
the consequences are left to federal officials and to other nations.3
Other Uruguay Round dissenters focused on a portion of the
Beer II decision holding that a Minnesota tax incentive for intrastate
micro-breweries was inconsistent with GATT.' Critics feared that
similar decisions would limit the states' abilities to favor certain
77. United States Measures Affecting Alcohol and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992,
GATE B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 276 (1993) [hereinafter Beer II].
78. See id. at para. 6.1.
79. See id.
80. Id. at paras. 5.32-5.33.
81. Id. at para. 6.1(r).
82. 140 CONG. REc. S15,151 (daily ed. Nov. 30,1994) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
83. Tribe statement, supra note 12, at 303.
84. See Beer II, supra note 77, at para. 5.19.
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classes of producers, ' irrespective of nationality.' For example,
Senator Kempthorne expressed how GATT panel decisions might
affect the laws of his state: "[T]he Idaho legislature has enacted an
investment tax credit which allows companies to deduct plant
investments. It is not hard to imagine a WTO panel determining that
this investment tax credit favors Idaho industries over foreign
competition."'
Consumer groups also warned that GATT would weaken state
consumer protection laws.' For example, consumer advocate Ralph
Nader argued that foreign nations would challenge state laws as
illegal trade barriers through the DSB, thus overturning state
environmental, labor and consumer laws and regulations."
Moreover, this could chill any proposed state legislation that
potentially violates GATT.' This result, Nader asserted, would
subordinate domestic policies and domestic democratic bodies to
international mercantile interests and to "a dispute resolution body
located in Geneva, Switzerland that would operate in secret and
without the guarantees of due process and citizen participation found
in domestic legislative bodies and courts. ' O' While Nader's comments
appear to represent the extreme view of international trade
agreements, he was not without an audience.
A. Federal Government Grants States Certain Concessions in
Exchange for State Support of the Proposed WTO
As the Uruguay Round progressed, state representatives and
scholarly commentators aggressively voiced their opposition to any
potential international trade agreement that could further restrict
state domestic policies.9 Maine Attorney General Mike Carpenter
wrote a letter to President Clinton, co-signed by forty-two other state
attorneys general and the Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico,
85. See Tribe statement, supra note 12, at 306.
86. 140 CONG. REC. S15,271, S15,302 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Kempthorne).
87. See GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S.2467 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103 Cong. 359 (1994) (prepared
statement of Ralph Nader, consumer advocate) [hereinafter Nader statement].
88. See id. at 357-59.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 359.
91. See, e.g., Nader statement, supra note 87, at 357-59; see also David S, Cloud,
Critics Fear GATT May Declare Open Season on U.S. Law, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
2005,2009 (1994); Tribe statement, supra note 12, at 306-09.
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formally requesting a meeting between representatives from the
federal government and state governments prior to the
Administration's submission of the GATT legislation to Congress.' "
On July 15, 1994, meetings began between officials from the United
States Trade Representative's (USTR) office and various state
attorneys general.' As a direct result of these discussions, the GATT
legislation and the accompanying Statement of Administrative Action
(SAA) contained four safeguards designed to curb state sovereignty
fears over the proposed WTO agreement."
1. Federal Duty to Consult with States on All Relevant Trade
Matters
The Congressionally enacted GATT legislation mandates that
the USTR consults with states on any matter that relates to, or could
potentially affect, state law. ' After such consultation, states must be
given the opportunity to submit, and the USTR must consider, any
information or advice on all international trade controversies
affecting the states.9 Furthermore, the USTR is required to appoint a
WTO coordinator for state matters and to develop a system to give
notice to a governor's designee about any international trade matters
that might affect state laws or regulations.'
2. Federal-State Cooperation in WTO Dispute Settlement
The USTR is required to notify both the governor and the state
attorney general within seven days after a foreign nation requests
consultation with the United States regarding whether a state law
violates GAIT.?8 After the governor appoints a representative on the
matter, the USTR must actively consult with the state's
representative.? Thereafter, the state representative must be
afforded the opportunity to advise and assist the USTR in defending
92. Letter from Michael E. Carpenter, Maine Attorney General, et al. to
President Clinton (July 13, 1994), reprinted in 140 CONG. REc. S8847, S8853 (daily
ed. July 1, 1994).
93. Christine T. Milliken, Incorporating Principles of Domestic Federalism Within
the Framework of the World Trade Organization, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J.,
June 1995, at 45,48.
94. See Uruguay Round, supra note 15, §§ 101-03,19 U.S.C. §§ 3511-13.
95. See id. § 102(b)(1)(B)(i).
96. Id §§ 102(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
97. See id. §§ 102(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
98. See id § 102(b)(1)(C)(i).
99. See id. § 102(b)(1)(C)(ii).
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the state law.1 'O However, the USTR retains the discretion whether to
defend any state law before the WTO."1
3. Federal Duty to Notify States Prior to the USTR's
Challenging Other Nations' Sub-National Governmental
Laws'02
The United States must afford states thirty days notice prior to
initiating a consultation against another nation's sub-national
measures. 103  This requirement may, however, be waived under
exigent circumstances-." In such a case, the USTR must notify the
states within three days of any action taken. 5
4. Legal Challenges to State Law Are Restricted to Federal
Government
Only the federal government may mount a legal challenge
against a state's laws or regulations. 6 The USTR is required to give
thirty days notice prior to bringing an action in federal court to
overturn a state law that impermissibly violates GATT."" Moreover,
a report must be filed with the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee explaining the court action,
thereby providing for a full public debate on the matter. If the
federal government brings suit to preempt the challenged state law,
the federal government bears the burden of proving that the state law
violates GATT. 9 The SAA specifically states that the federal
government may not bring a court action against a state on the
grounds that its worker safety, environmental or public health
standards are stricter than those of the federal government."'
100. See id. § 102(b)(1)(C)(iii).
101. See id.
102. See id. § 102(b)(1)(D)(i).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. § 102(b)(1)(D)(ii).
106. See id. § 102(b)(2)(A).
107. See id. § 102(b)(2)(C)
108. See id.
109. See id. §§ 102(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv).
110. See id. §§ 102(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
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B. Insufficiency of the Federal Government's Duty to Consult with
States on International Trade Matters
Although the federal government is required to consult with the
states on international trade issues that could potentially conflict with
state laws or regulations, there is no duty for the federal government
to defend state laws or regulations before the WTO."' Thus, a
foreign nation could challenge a state law or regulation, and the
federal government could refuse to defend the challenged state
action. As a result, states would be barred from mounting any
defense before the WTO. This violates every facet of domestic
considerations of due process. Furthermore, there is no requirement
for the federal government to bring an action on behalf of a state
impermissibly targeted by foreign sanctions or trade restrictions.
Simply put, although the federal government is obligated to inform
and consult with the states regarding international trade matters, it is
under no obligation to act on behalf of the states in the international
arena.
Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives rejected an
amendment prohibiting the federal government from legally
challenging state or local laws that violate GATT. 2 The amendment
specifically barred the federal government from enforcing a WTO
panel decision rendered against any state or local law.
IV. Massachusetts Law Raises the Possibility of International
Sanctions
State and local governments in the United States have enacted a
variety of measures aimed at severing ties with businesses that
conduct activities in countries accused of human rights violations."'
Specifically, state-enacted "selective purchasing laws" have been
around for decades." For example, more than forty states have
measures containing a "buy-American" provision."' Moreover, by
111. See id. § 102(b)(1)(C)(iii).
112. See Lobe, supra note 5, at 1.
113. See id at 2.
114. See Evelyn Iritani, Massachusetts Law Sets Off Trade Flap Commerce:
Sanctions on Firms in Myanmar Provoke Ire in Europe and Raise Issues over States'
Rights Versus World Trade, L.A. TIMEs, June 19,1997, at Dl.
115. Lorraine Woellert, Burma Boycotts Collide with Trade Agreements, WASH.
Trivs, Apr. 20,1997, at Al.
116. See id
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the middle of 1998, the state of Massachusetts, 17 a California county"8
and eighteen U.S. cities119 adopted laws seeking to penalize businesses
that invest in Burmal
The substance and language of the state and local anti-Burma
measures are similar in most respects.2  Many contain a preamble
citing and condemning the human rights abuses of the Burmese
government." Several of the enactments refer to the courage and
struggle of Aung San Suu Kyi and other notable political dissidents
who oppose the Burmese government."n Moreover, in an effort to
avoid constitutional attacks, many of the measures include language
enumerating a legitimate local purpose in taking a stand against
international injustice and human rights violations.'24  The
Massachusetts measure defines doing business with Burma in the
following terms:m (1) having a principle place of business or any
operations, leases, franchises, majority-owned subsidiaries,
distribution agreements or any other similar agreements in Burma;26
(2) providing financial services to the government of Burma;' (3)
promoting the importation or sale of commerce largely controlled by
the government of Burma; or (4) providing any goods or services to
the government of Burma 29
117. See Act of June 25,1996, ch. 130, § 1, 1996 Mass. Acts 210.
118. Alameda County.
119. These municipalities are Berkeley, Oakland, Palo Alto, San Francisco, Santa
Cruz, Santa Monica and West Hollywood, CA; Boulder, CO; Takoma Park, MD;
Brookline, Newton, Quincy and Somerville, MA; Ann Arbor, MI; Carborro and
Chapel Hill, NC; New York City, NY; and Madison, WI.
120. In June 1989, the Burmese government renamed the country the Union of
Myanmar. Officials made the name change in order to "better reflect ethnic
diversity. The term Burma connotes Burman, the nation's dominant ethnic group, to
the exclusion of other ethnic minorities." Burma Decides It's the 'Union of
Myanmar,' L.A. TIMES, June 21,1989, at 11.
121. See, e.g., David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State
and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma
(Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 176-79 (1997) (asserting that the anti-
Burma ordinances are constitutionally infirm under federal preemption, the
Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause).
122. See id. at 180.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22G (West 1996).
126. See id. § 22G(a).
127. See id. § 22G(b).
128. See id. § 22G(c).
129. See id. § 22G(d).
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The purpose of the Massachusetts law is to prohibit state entities
from dealing with businesses engaged in Burma in a variety of
contexts. For example, state entities may not sell, rent or dispose of
any real property to any person doing business in or with Burma."
State entities also may not purchase products or services from any
such business."3
In Massachusetts, the Secretary is responsible for maintaining a
list of businesses engaged in activities in Burma.' - In establishing the
list, the Secretary is mandated to "consult United Nations reports,
resources of the Investor Responsibility Research Center and the
Associates to Develop Democratic Burma, and other reliable
sources."'33 Furthermore, the list must be updated at least once every
three months,' and the Secretary is responsible for providing the list
to all state entities. 5 Finally, the Secretary is authorized and directed
to promulgate regulations to assure implementation of the anti-
Burma law.'
In the two years that Massachusetts' anti-Burma law has been in
effect, it has produced limited results in the quest to curb Burma's
human rights violations. In response to the various anti-Burma
measures around the country, Amoco, Apple Computer, Carlsberg,
Columbia, Levi Strauss, Liz Claiborne, Philips Electronics and Eddie
Bauer ceased doing business in and with Burma. "  In addition,
"[t]here is a steadily growing number of companies that have
evaluated the business opportunities in Burma, and have decided that
it makes more sense to leave rather than face consumer boycotts or
penalties from selective purchasing laws."'' By contrast, many oil
companies, including Unocal, Atlantic Richfield Company, Texaco
and France's Total continue to engage in substantial business in
Burma. 9 Moreover, there is no evidence that Burma's oppressive
130. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 40F (West 1996).
131. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22J (West 1996).
132. See id. § 221(a).
133. Id § 221(b).
134. See id. § 22J(c).
135. See id. § 22J(d).
136. See MASS. GEN. LAvS ANN. ch. 7, § 22K (West 1996).
137. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, MULTINATIONAL
BUSINESS IN BURMA (MYANMAR) iii (1996).
138. See id
139. Abid Aslam, Unions Want Tough Action Against Burma, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Aug. 12,1997, available iz 1997 WL 13256032.
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regime has softened since the state and local laws were passed.14
A. Massachusetts Law Comes Under Attack
The EU and Japan first made objections to the Massachusetts
law in January 1997."' In October 1998, Japanese and EU officials
formally requested the WTO to set up a dispute resolution panel to
look into Massachusetts' anti-Burma law.4' Even though the EU
withdrew special trading preferences from Burma in response to
human rights abuses, it resists any similar actions from U.S. states.143
"The EU argues that the growing 'sanctions' movement in the United
States has to be challenged when states and cities championing it take
measures that, in effect, extend their legislative reach to other
companies."'"
Prior to September 1998, the U.S. government did not signal any
willingness to defend the Massachusetts law before the WTO from
the impending EU attack.4 5 Fearing that the U.S. government would
not risk its relationship with the EU over the Massachusetts law,
proponents of the anti-Burma law rallied around it.'46 Reacting to the
prospect of a formal EU complaint before the WTO Thomas A.
Barnico, a Massachusetts assistant attorney general, warned, "it's not
just another case .... There's a distinct possibility it will set
precedent for the handling of state laws by the WTO.""' Moreover,
the leaders of eleven domestic trade unions called on President
Clinton to "vigorously defend" the Massachusetts law." According
to Kenneth Zinn, North American coordinator of the International
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers'
Unions, "if the people of Massachusetts don't want their tax dollars
spent on products from companies complicit in torture and
repression, that's their right .... The WTO has no right to tell [these
140. See id.
141. See id.; see also Massachusetts Law on Burma Riles EU, CHIcAGO TRIB., Dec.
19, 1997, at 34.
142. Selinger, supra note 11, at B8.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Michael S. Lelyveld, Judge Hears Arguments Against Myanmar Sanctions, J.
COM., Sep. 24, 1998, at 3A (Clinton administration pledges to defend the
Massachusetts law before the WTO, even though it views the law as an infringement
on federal authority).
146. Aslam, supra note 139.
147. Fairclough, supra note 2.
148. See id.
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taxpayers] from whom they should and shouldn't buy."'"
V. Extending Standing to States
In 1994, the EU published a report identifying more than 2,700
sub-national laws and municipal ordinances that potentially violate
GATT. Professor Robert Stumberg, director of Georgetown
University's Center for Policy Alternatives, identified ninety laws in
California alone that could be challenged under the WTO." Among
these are measures designed to insure food safety, environmental
health and energy compensation.L"' Even state laws favoring local
companies or set-aside contracts for female and minority-owned
businesses could be attacked under the WTO.'
Furthermore, WTO-approved sanctions could not only harm the
economy of states whose laws are challenged,L4 they could also
cripple political stands against injustice around the globe.' Simon
Billenness of the Franklin Research Institute, an investment firm that
led the call for Massachusetts' anti-Burma law, noted, "boycotts...
are intrinsically American. If it wasn't for a boycott of tea from
Britain, you wouldn't have an American Constitution in the first
place. ' "6 In sum, international attacks on state measures could wreak
havoc on domestic policy.
To quell any potential public discontent with international trade
agreements, states must be provided a forum to protect themselves
from foreign challenges to their laws. Either of two proposals could
provide such a forum. First, Congress could obligate the USTR to
defend state laws or regulations against a foreign challenge before the
WTO. Alternatively, the federal government could lobby other
WTO members to amend the Final Act to grant standing to sub-
national governments.
Under the first proposal, if a state measure is deemed valid and
constitutional under state and federal law, then the U.S. government
149. Id.
150. Commission Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment, Doc.
No. 1/194194 (Apr. 1994).
151. Iritani, supra note 114.
152. See id.
153. Woellert, supra note 115.
154. US Urges Europe to Drop WTO Threat, AGENcE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 9,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2130917.
155. Woellert, supra note 115.
156. Id.
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would have to defend that law before the WTO on any occasion when
a foreign government leveled a formal complaint against the state
law. In cases where courts have not ruled on the constitutionality of
the state law, or the ruling is under appeal, the obligation to defend
the state law would be given full effect. Moreover, in mounting a
defense, the USTR would have to provide the state government
meaningful and significant participation in assisting the USTR's
response to the WTO complaint.
Alternatively, the U.S. government could lobby other member
nations of GATT to amend the Final Act to grant standing to sub-
national governments. This would certainly curb state fears over loss
of sovereignty. Any time a state law is challenged, that particular
state could mount a defense before the WTO on its own behalf. This
alternative is more efficient than requiring the federal government to
defend the state law.
Professor Philip M. Nichols of the University of Pennsylvania's
Wharton School of Business criticizes extending standing before the
WTO to any entity other than national governments,'3 Professor
Nichols argues that expanding standing beyond member nations will
impair nations' ability to negotiate trade policies,'58 lead to inequity
since certain private organizations will have the money to bring an
action before the WTO while others will not 59 and cause the WTO to
move away from free trade since most well-funded non-nation
entities are protectionist and against free trade in some form."W While
Professor Nichols arguments are persuasive, there are more limited
alternatives that will dispose of many of his well-reasoned concerns.
First, standing should be granted only to sub-national
governments. This would preclude overwhelming the WTO's DSB
with a multitude of complaints from various private entities (e.g.
international unions) whose grant of standing Professor Nichols
challenges. Second, granting standing to sub-national governments
should be restricted to a grant of defense. They should not have the
power to bring a complaint before the WTO. This would protect the
WTO from being overwhelmed with an unmanageable number of
complaints. Rather, state standing should be restricted to the ability
to defend themselves if a complaint by a member nation is brought
157. See Nichols, supra note 7, at 316.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 318.
160. See id. at 319-20.
[Vol. 21:957
The World Trade Organization and States' Rights
before the VTO against a state law. Simply put, this compromise
would comport with fundamental notions of due process while not
overwhelming the WTO's docket.
VI. Conclusion
Given the international focus on state trade laws and regulations,
it is likely that threats from foreign nations to challenge state laws
before the WTO will continue. In fact, with Massachusetts proposing
legislation to expand the anti-Burma law to penalize businesses
investing in Indonesia,"' and with states and localities already
mobilizing opposition to a proposed Multilateral Agreement on
Investment," tensions between states and the international
community are almost certain to continue.'"
Presently, a foreign nation can successfully bring a claim against
a state before the V/TO and the V/TO can then issue sanctions
against the particular state for violating GAIT. The state is,
however, entirely prevented from defending itself. Domestic
discontent with international treaties would almost inevitably follow
attempts by the VTO to direct sub-national policy, perhaps signaling
a new trend against international trade agreements. Granting states
the power to protect themselves from foreign attack on domestic laws
would strike the optimal balance between insuring domestic
tranquility and promoting international commerce.
161. David R. Schmahmann et al., Off the Precipice" Massaciusetts E pands its
Foreign Policy Expedition From Burma to Indonesia, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L
1021,1022(1997).
162. Woellert, supra note 115.
163. See id.
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